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THE PROBLEM AND ITS BACKGROUND
Introduction
The great attention given to the arena of local government is
a relatively recent phenomena in the study of politics.

It is perhaps

one of the most potentially fruitful areas being explored by the polit
ical scientist today.

As pointed out by Jacob and Lipsky, "Much of

the work in political science which has influenced the drift of the
profession has been within its [local politics] domain."

With the

shift of focus from formal arrangements and particular institutions,
defined in legalistic terms, the study of local government has assumed
universal implications because of the new emphasis upon policy.

Under

standing the process of policy determination at this level should en
able the political scientist to better understand and explain
political behavior at higher levels of government where the N is
smaller and more difficult to generalize from.
Contributing to this examination of policy at the municipal
level has been the development of new approaches to questions of
political behavior.

Making a valuable contribution as a conceptual

tool in several of these new approaches is Easton's system theory
which provides a framework for the study of political behavior.

2

^Herbert Jacob and Michael Lipsky, "Outputs, Structure, and
Power: An Assessment of Changes in the Study of State and Local
Politics," Journal of Politics, XXX (May, 1968), 510.
2
David Easton, "An Approach to the Analysis of Political
Systems," World Politics, IX (April, 1957), 383-400.
1
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Using the Eastonian concepts— environment, inputs, political system or
process, and outputs— numerous political scientists have begun to
delve systematically into the inter-relationships of these various
factors at the state and local level.

3

The results of such efforts

have often been less than satisfying to the political scientist.

He

has found that in the majority of cases environmental factors, rather
than political factors, are the primary influencers of outputs.
Additionally, the incompleteness of many of these investigations re
flect the deficiency in our knowledge of many of these variables.
As pointed out by Jacob and Lipsky, operationalizations of
the concepts of environment, input, political system and output have
been characterized by incomplete and inadequate measurement of the
variables.

There is presently a lack of synoptic indicators of the
4

conversion process.

These conditions and the previous findings

present to the political scientist a challenging and potentially
fruitful area for future investigation.

3

See, for example, Richard I. Hofferbert, "The Relation
Between Public Policy and Some Structural and Environmental Variables
in the American States." American Political Science Review, LX (March,
1966), 73-82; Thomas R. Dye, Politics, Economics, and the Public
(Chicago: Rand McNally & Company, 1966); Thomas R. Dye, "CitySuburban Social Distance and Public Policy," Social Forces, XXXXIV
(September, 1965), 100-106; Edgar L. Sherbenou, "Class, Partici
pation and the Council-Manager Plan," Public Administration Review,
XXL (Summer, 1961), 131-135; Louis H. Masotti and Don R. Bowen,
"Communities and Budgets: The Sociology of Municipal Expenditures,"
Urban Affairs Quarterly, I (December, 1965), 39-58; Lewis A. Froman,
Jr., "An Analysis of Public Policies in Cities," Journal of Politics,
XXIX (February, 1967), 94-108; Bryan T. Downes, "Suburban Differen
tiation and Municipal Policy Choices: A Comparative Analysis of
Suburban Political Systems," in Community Structure and DecisionMaking, ed. by Terry N. Clark (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing
Company, 1968), pp. 243-268.
4
Jacob and Lipsky, "Outputs, Structure, and Power:" 515-519.
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STATEMENT OF PROBLEM
In an attempt to explore an area of inadequate knowledge and
to find a political factor significantly related to outputs, the
political system's relationship to outputs at the municipal level will
be examined.

Specifically, this research will be concerned with the

impact of the characteristics of those authorities who make up the
authority structure of the political system to system outputs as
reflected by substantive policy choices.

These authority character

istics will be investigated to determine if, in fact, they are sig
nificantly related to policy choices made by local governments.
An approach very similar to the one used in other studies of
local government will be undertaken in determining the relationship
between authority characteristics and policy outputs.

The starting

point of this research is Easton's model in which he presents the
deceptively simple formula:

input— political system— output.^

Easton views inputs as those things which keep the system going.
They are converted by the political system into outputs.

The re

sulting outputs affect both the system and the environment in which
the system exists.

The initial inputs into the system can be divided

into two basic kinds:

demands and supports.

supports, inputs reflect the environment.

Through demands and

Environment then has an

indirect influence on both political system and outputs.

^See David Easton, "An Approach to the Analysis of Political
Systems," for a more complete development of this model.
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4
Because of the difficulty in empirical research of directly measuring
inputs reflected in demands and supports, environment vill be measured
instead.

Thus, measuring inputs indirectly through environment vill

result in the Eastonian formula being altered slightly to reflect
this: environment— political system— outputs.

This altered formula

vill be utilized here.
Vith this modification ve vill be dealing vith a model vhich
has received extensive use in the past.

A model in vhich environment

is vieved as a major component and possibly the prime determinate of
outputs if previous studies of local government are to be accepted as
correct.

Hovever. an underlying premise of this thesis rests on the

assumption that if system outputs are defined as the authoritative
allocatio'n of values for the community then there must necessarily be
someone or something performing this authoritative allocation.

It is

difficult to see logically hov environmental factors can be the sole
or prime determinate of outputs if ve accept the definition of out
puts given.
It cannot.

Hov can environment make authoritative allocations?
Thus to keep vithin the framevork of the model something

in the political system must perform the function of authoritatively
allocating values for the community.

Of the different possible com

ponents making up the political system the one most plausible to per
form this function is contained vithin the authority structure.

The

structure itself has been shovn to have little influence upon outputs.

^For a more complete discussion see Chester B. Rogers,
’’Environment, System and Output— The Consideration of a Model."
Social Forces, XXXXVIII (September, 1969), 1-2.
7
See the Reviev of the Literature (p. 5) for examples.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

7

Those who make up the authority structure have not been previously
examined to determine if they might influence the outputs of the
system.

Thus, difference among those who compose the authority

structure are likely to have an influence upon outputs.

To ascertain

if these differences are reflected in the variance of outputs found,
the characteristics of the authorities who compose the authority
structure will be examined.
From this brief treatment it has been shown that difficulties
do exist in our efforts at understanding and explaining local politi
cal behavior.

Vith the notable exception of Lineberry and Fowler's

g

work.

no intervening variable between environment and output has

been found.

If nothing in the political system is significant in the

conversion process, then governmental variations are unimportant and
all that need be studied is the environment to thus be able to deter
mine what outputs are to be produced.

This presents a picture of

predetermined politics arising from the environment which the
political scientist is reluctant to accept.

This thesis is another

attempt at locating those mechanisms by which the political system
influences outputs.
Review of the Literature
Vhile much has been written about local political behavior,
one of the most useful studies in expanding our knowledge of the
influence of the political system upon outputs has been Lineberry and

Lineberry and Fowler, op.cit.
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Fowler's article "Reformism and Public Politics in American Cities."
In their research, they begin by examining Banfield and Wilson's
"middle-class ethos" of political reformers which has resulted in the
middle class standing for "public-regarding" virtues rather than the
"private—regarding" values of the ethnic politics of machines and
bosses.

It is their contention that "governments which are products

of the reform movement behave differently from those vhich have unre
formed institutions, even if the socio-economic composition of their
population may be similar.^

In examining this concept they determined

the impact of both socio-economic variables and political structure
variables upon the outputs of municipal government.
ysis three principal conclusions were drawn.

From their anal

First, reformed and un

reformed cities were not markedly different in terms of demographic
variables.

The second conclusion was that the most important differ

ence between the two kinds of cities arose from their behavior rather
than their demography.

Outputs of unreformed cities are more exactly

predicted through the use of multiple correlation coefficients than
those of reformed cities:

"Thus, political institutions seem to play

an important role in the political process— a role substantially independent of a city's demography."

11

This role is one in which

institutions "filter" the process of converting inputs into outputs—

9Ibid.
1°Ibid., p. 100.
11 Ibid., p. 121.
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they determine the degree of the closeness of the relationship between
environment and output rather than output itself.

Finally, reformism,

to Lineberry and Fowler, can be reviewed as a continuous variable—
one ranging from the presence of only one feature of reformed government to those containing all of the accepted measures of reformism.
Reformed political structures have an additive effect:

12

the greater

the degree of reformism present, the lower the responsiveness to
political conflict of that institution.

The policy measurements

selected for testing were a taxation measure computed by dividing the
total personal income of the city into the total tax of the city and
an expenditure measure obtained by dividing the expenditures of the
city by the city's aggregate personal income.
This study is significant to not only
the discipline for two principal

reasons.

this thesis but alsoto

First, it has served as a

meaningful rebuttal to Wolfinger and Field's

attack on the ethos

theory and the concept of public

regarding values.^

vs. private

Wolfinger and Field found that the applicability of the ethos theory
was limited primarily to the Midwest Region.

The differences in

structural variables found were attributed to regional variations in
the age of the cities— not to any properties contained in the theory.
To them the ethos theory needed a great deal of modification to be

As a further check on reformism being a continuous variable,
the reformism present in the Ohio studies was taken and Guttman scaled.
The coefficient of reproducibility was .972 and the coefficient of
scalability was .961.
13
Raymond E. Wolfinger and John Osgood Field, "Political Ethos
and the Structure of City Government," American Political Science
Review, LX (June, 1966), 306-326.
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useable in explanation.

The subsequent rebuttal by Lineberry and

Fovler permits the utilization of the dichotomous public-regarding
and private-regarding values vhen examining authority characteristics.
Perhaps, more importaiutly, they have presented evidence of the im
portance of the political system in the determination of outputs at
a time when the bulk of the literature would seem to suggest that en
vironment is the prime determinate of outputs.

This is extremely

useful here because if political structures make an impact then,
hopefully, the authorities making up those structures will also have
an influence upon outputs.
Arrayed against the findings of Lineberry and Fowler are a
number of other studies which have found that environment, not po
litical structure, is the prime determinate of outputs.

This has

been found true not only at the local level but also at the state
level.

Hofferbert in his article "The Relationships Between Public

Policy and Some Structural and Environmental Variables in the American States"

14

found that neither structural characteristics of

government nor the nature of the party system and its operation ex
plain policy outputs in the states.

He did find a "clear indication

that there is a relationship between environment and policy."

15

Hofferbert used several different measures of policy in this study.
For one measure he developed a welfare orientation ranking computated
from the sum of the individual ranks of mean expenditures for ten

14
Hofferbert, op. cit.
^Ibid., p . 82.
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years on five different welfare expenditures by the respective states.
Another was developed by calculating the percentage of general rev
enue supplied directly to each of the state's two largest cities by
the state government.
Another investigation at the state level that produced similar
findings was Dye's Politics, Economics, and the Public. ^

Using ninety

different measures of five prime political concerns of the states. Dye
found that political system characteristics— the division of the twoparty vote, the level of interparty competition, the level of voter
participation, and the degree of malapportionment in the legislature—
had little effect on policy outcomes in these states.

The outputs

measured were in the areas of education, health and welfare, high
ways, taxation and revenue, and regulation of public morality.

Dye

used the phrase "regulation of public morality" to represent a sum
mary measure of police protection, crime control, correctional policy,
character of state bureaucracy, and level of general social control.
He found that the "differences in the policy choices of states with
different types of political systems turn out to be largely a product
of differing socio-economic levels rather than a direct product of
political variables."

17

In other words, the environment rather than

the political system determined outputs at the state level.
Further evidence strengthening such a position emerges from
the majority of the studies investigating urban politics in this

Dye, op. cit.
^Ibid., p. 293.
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10

manner.

Dye in another study described policy differences of cities

in terms of the socio-economic variables of the inhabitants of those
cities.

18

He found that differences in the social character of the

city and suburbs produces differences in public policy choices.

Once

again it is not the political system that produces differences in out
puts but rather environmental variables of a socio-economic nature.
This time Dye measures outputs by measuring per pupil educational
expenditure rate, municipal per capita expenditure rate, property tax
rates, and municipal per capita indebtedness.
In "Class, Participation, and the Council-Manager Plan"

19

Sherbenou considers the relationship of the council-manager plan to
social class where social class is the independent variable.

To do

this he compares class position of cities, as measured by median
dwelling unit value, to the form of government.

Sherbenou finds that

there is a definite coincidence between the council-manager plan with
middle and upper class patterns, a finding in conflict with Lineberry
and Fowler's evidence that reformism is not related to the environ
ment.

He goes on to consider the effect of this form of government

upon policy choices by comparing manager and non-manager cities.
The policy choices utilized were municipal per capita expenditure
rate, municipal per capita debt, and municipal per capita property
tax.

Sherbenou found that differing forms of municipal government

do have different outputs.

18
19

Those cities with middle and upper class

Dye, "City-Suburban Social Distance and Public Policy."
Sherbenou, op. cit.
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11

housing patterns were found to have predominately council-manager
forms of government.

This type of government was found to have higher

expenditures per capita, lower net municipal debt per capita, and
higher property taxes per capita than other governmental forms.
Environment as represented by social class affected outputs by in
fluencing the type of authority structure of the political system.
A study assuming that outputs are based upon environment was
conducted by Massotti and Bowen.

20

In their investigation, they

felt that since political decision-makers do not operate in a social
vacuum the responses of different decision-makers to similar en
vironmental stimuli would likely be similar.

They found that vari

ations in the responses as measured by levels of expenditures were
associated with three environmental variables— socio-economic status,
age of residents, and population mobility.

Environment again directly

determining outputs.
Using policy output measurements of municipal expenditure per
capita, police and fire expenditure per capita, public works ex
penditure per capita, parks and recreation expenditure per capita,
municipal receipts per capita, and municipal tax rate, Downes develops
a typology of policy choices in "Suburban Differentiation and Municipal
Policy Choices."
levels:

21

This typology is composed of four expenditure

high expenditures, high expenditures for selected services,

20Masotti and Bowen, op.cit,
21

Downes, op. cit.
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low expenditures except for selected services, and low expenditures.
He finds that it "vould be very difficult to argue that the council
decision process had much effect on these aggregate measures of a
community’s operative committment to particular goals and objectives."

22

Rather, Downes argues that community socio-economic characteristics
are the most important determinates of municipal policy.

One more

link in the chain joining environment and outputs.
A final example of environment producing outputs is Froman's
article "An Analysis of Public Policies in Cities."

23

To Froman,

public policy should be treated simply by attempting to find out what
particular "things" are associated with what particular policies so
that theories about these differences and the difference variables of
public policy can be developed.

The question he seeks to answer is:

"Do different kinds of policies have associated with them different
kinds of 'environmental' variables in such a way that we can say
something about how certain policies are related to other phenomena?"

24

The theoretical premise underlying this study is that public policy is
directly related to cleavages within the community; the cleavages them
selves being affected by the presence or absence of social and ec
onomic diversity.

By examining six different policy outputs (manager-

couneil form of government, non-partisan elections, annexation, inter-

22Ibid., p. 263.
23

Froman, op.cit.

24Ibid., p. 95.
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municipal cooperation, fluoridation, and urban renewal), Froman
found that they were related to the homogeneity or heterogeneity
within a community as measured by social and economic diversity.
Two of the outputs selected (manager form of government and non
partisan elections) are really structural variables rather than out
puts and thus their use in this manner is questioned.

In each of

these five examples presented, environment, not political system,
seemed to be the determinate of outputs at the local governmental
level.

Hypotheses
The literature cited has dealt with authority structures and
outputs (Lineberry and Fowler, Hofferbert, Dye, and Downes), environ
ment and outputs (Dye, Masotti and Bowen, Froman), and environment,
authority structures and outputs (Lineberry and Fowler, Sherbenou,
and Downes).

Vith the exception of the Lineberry and Fowler article,

the major result of these efforts has been the determination that
outputs appear to be primarily determined by environmental factors.
This would seem to indicate that outputs are predetermined and not
subject to influence by the political system.

However, this evidence

is not accepted as conclusive because of the inability of the environ
ment to explain all of the variance found in outputs.

This suggests

that other variables are at work which is supported by the findings
of Lineberry and Fowler.

As a test of this position, another test

will be conducted in this thesis which will hopefully result in a
finding that outputs are indeed influenced by the political system.
To do this the characteristics of those making up the elected local
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governmental authority structure will be examined.

If a significant

relationship is found between authority characteristics of the po
litical system and outputs, then a step forward in the quest of the
explanation of local political behavior can be made.
From the direction of the discussion so far, the basic hy
pothesis of this thesis can clearly be seen to be that authority
characteristics of the political system do influence outputs.

Due

to the lack of specific research in the area of authority character
istics, it is difficult to formulate a specific set of hypotheses.
Because of this and the exploratory nature of this study, it will
only be possible to propose hypotheses in which the direction of
relationship between the independent and dependent variables will
not be given.

With this qualification in mind, the following hypoth

eses are suggested as being useful for testing here.
1.

SES authority characteristics are significantly related
to the following outputs:
a)

Policies insuring equal rights for all groups livin
in the community.

b)

Policies benefiting particular segments of the
community.

2.

c)

Increases in council salary schedule.

d)

Enactment of municipal income tax.

e)

Fluoridation of water supply.

Partisan affiliation and ideological identification of
authorities are significantly related to the following
outputs:
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a)

Policies insuring equal rights for all groups living
in the community.

b)

Policies benefiting particular segments of the
community.

3.

c)

Increases in council salary schedule.

d)

Enactment of municipal income tax.

e)

Fluoridation of vater supply.

Aspiration for higher partisan office held by authorities
is significantly related to the following outputs:
a)

Policies insuring equal rights for all groups living
in the community.

b)

Policies benefiting particular segments of the
community.

c)

Enactment of municipal income tax.

The independent variables selected for use as measurements of
authority characteristics are socio-economic status, partisan affil
iation and ideological identification, aspiration for higher partisan
office, and length of service.
reasons.

They were chosen for two principal

First, they were readily available for use in this thesis

having been previously collected for another study.

Secondly, and more

importantly, they all have been proven to be useful measures in other
investigations of political behavior and thus likely to have some
effect on policy determination.

SES, partisan affiliation and ideo

logical identification have been effectively utilized in voting behavio
25
studies such as The American Voter.

Each one of these was shown to

^ A ngus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and
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have a significant impact on the voting behavior of the American elec
torate.
ship

26

SES vas examined by Bell, Hill and Wright in Public Leaderin which they dealt with the social science research litera

ture of public leadership in the United States.

The literature of

legislative behavior reveals usage of all of these variables in some
manner.
System

Vahlke, Eulau, Buchanan, and Ferguson in The Legislative

27

consider each of them in their theoretical framework of

analysis and further examine them in the actual study of the four
state legislatures.

Numerous articles in Legislative Behavior

28

make use of one or more of these variables in the investigation of
legislatures and legislators.

These examples of former utilization

provide adequate support to justify their use as independent variables
in this study.
The outputs utilized in this study are basically different
from those used in other studies.

As pointed out when discussing

some of the literature, most policy outputs were some type of municipal
revenue or expenditure measure.

The majority of these measures were

shown to be primarily reflections of environmental conditions rather

Donald E. Stokes, The American Voter (New York: John Wiley & Sons,
Inc., 1954). See Section III for a complete development of partisan
affiliation and ideological identification. SES is developed in
Section IV.
“^Wendell Bell, Richard J. Hill, and Charles R. Wright, Public
Leadership (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Company, 1961).
27

John C. Wahlke, Heinz Eulau, William Buchanan, and LeRoy C.
Ferguson, The Legislative System (New York: John Wiley and Sons,
Inc., 1962).
28

John C. Wahlke and Heinz Eulau, eds., Legislative Behavior
(Glencoe, 111.:
The Free Press of Glencoe, 1959).
~
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than substantive decisions performed by the political system.

Be

cause of this, nev types of outputs were selected for use as the
dependent variable.

Substantive policy choices as reflected in the

hypothesis hopefully vill more accurately reflect differentiation of
outputs at the local level.
Details of Study
To test the hypothesis as formulated, data measuring the
independent and dependent variables were gathered from Ohio cities
larger than 25,000 population.

The authority characteristics data

was previously gathered by Harold Arman for his Master’s Degree thesis
under the auspices of The Institute of Public Affairs, Western Michigan University.

29

To gather these data, Arman administered a mailed

questionnaire in 1968 to the elected members of the governments of
these forty-seven cities.

The response to this questionnaire by the

councilmen was over fifty per cent in thirty-nine of those cities.
These thirty-nine cities are the ones that were finally examined be
cause the respective councils taken as a whole are being measured,
rather than the individual council members.

From this questionnaire,

the SES variables of age, income, and occupation were obtained along
vith partisan affiliation and ideological identification, aspiration
for higher office, and length of council service.

Obtaining this in

formation from officials newly elected in 1967 meant that the time
frame for this study had to run from the time they took office in 1967

29

Harold D. Arman, "A Reappraisal of Selected Characteristics
of Non-Partisan Elections" (unpublished thesis, Western Michigan
University, 1968), p. 120.
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to the present.

Thus the outputs of these Ohio cities necessarily

had to correspond to this same period because it was decisions by
these councils that were to be measured.

To measure these outputs,

questionnaires were sent to these same cities in July and August, 1969,
to obtain the various possible outputs.

The policy decisions chosen

were selected from eleven possible measures contained in this ques
tionnaire.

The details of the variables gathered will be discussed

in some depth in subsequent chapters.
The problem being faced in this thesis rests upon the near
failure of political scientists to find an intervening variable be
tween environment and output.

This failure results in a situation in

which the political system seems to have little or no influence upon
outputs.

This condition is to be approached as in most of the other

output studies of local government by using a modification of Easton's
system theory.

As the discussion of the literature pointed out, nearly

all studies find that environment is the prime determinate of output
with the exception of the findings of Lineberry and Fowler.

Accept

ing their results and the logic inherent in Easton's theory, the
basic hypothesis formulated is that authority characteristics are,
in fact, significantly related to outputs.

Exactly how the specific

hypotheses are to be treated will be presented in Chapter Two:
Methodology.

Chapter Three contains the analysis of the data used

in testing the hypothesis and Chapter Four presents the conclusions
that can be drawn from this study.
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METHODOLOGY OF INVESTIGATION
Sample
The actual testing of the hypotheses required that a number
of basic methodological decisions be made.
of the sample had to be made.

First, the determination

Because previously gathered data was

being used as the independent variable, the sample necessarily had
to correspond to that of the independent variable.

This sample was

particular Ohio cities in which Arman gathered data about non-partisan
elections.

He administered a mailed questionnaire in early 1968 to

newly elected city councils of forty-seven Ohio cities with over
25,000 population.

The questionnaire was sent to the mayors and

councilmen who made up those forty-seven governments as listed in The
Municipal Year Book.
were returned and

Of the total of 445 questionnaires mailed, 264

usable— a return of sixty percent.

Because coun

cils as a collectivity are being studies here, the acceptable return
rate for Armen’s questionnaire had to be based upon the whole coun
cil's response, not that of the individual members.

To insure that

an adequate representation of the council was obtained, each council
had to have a return on the questionnaire of at least fifty percent
to be used in this study.

Any return for a council less than this

figure was considered too sketchy to realistically represent the
council as a whole.
requirement.
return.

Thirty-nine of the forty-seven cities met this

Of those that did, only four had a one hundred percent

The median return was seventy-one percent.

Due to the

necessity of using councils rather than councilmen, the sample used

19
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here is a non-random, non-representative sample selected on the basis
of returns on Armen’s questionnaire.
The determination of the output data was also obtained by
the use of a mailed questionnaire.

This time the questionnaire was

mailed to the city clerks of those cities which had over a fifty per
cent council return rate on the first questionnaire.

The return from

the first mailing of the second questionnaire made in July, 1969, was
fifty-six percent.

A second mailing made in late July raised the

total return to seventy percent.

Because of the small N being dealt

with, the return from the two mailings was deemed insufficient and a
third mailing was made the first week of August.
from the three mailings was eighty-seven percent.

The total return
The failure to

achieve a one hundred percent return meant that the thirty-nine
cities receiving the second questionnaire were further reduced to
thirty-four.

These cities made up the final sample of the study.

Appendix I lists these cities.
Instruments
Two mailed questionnaires served as the instruments to gather
measures of the independent and dependent variables.

Armen's ques

tionnaire provided the needed information on socio-economic status,
partisan affiliation and ideological identification, aspiration for
higher office, and length of council service.

The first component of

SES was obtained by asking each councilman to give his age by checking
the appropriate age category.

The second— councilman's occupation—

was written down on the questionnaire.

It later was placed in
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Backstrom and Hursh’s occupational classificaxion groupings.

The

last component of SES, income, vas the councilman’s yearly income
less compensation received for services as a councilman.

Partisan

affiliation vas determined by asking the councilman about his partisan
voting habits.

The ideological identification of a councilman vas

his ovn self-identification reflected by placing himself on a con
tinuum running from liberal to moderate to conservative.

The council

man vas asked to indicate vhether he had any aspiration for higher
partisan office.
vas sought.

Finally, the number of years served on the council

Appendix II lists the questions used from Armen’s

questionnaire and the Backstrom and Hursh occupational classification
groupings.
The questionnaire used in obtaining information about sub
stantive policy decisions vas designed for both ease in completion by
city clerks and adequate provision of the necessary data.

Eleven dif

ferent policy areas vere measured in the questionnaire in the hope
that from these eleven an adequate number of measures vould be found
to test the hypotheses.

These policy measures vere federal urban

reneval, local urban reneval, citizen police reviev board, open
housing, human relations commission, fluoridiation, equal opportunity
hiring policy, council code of ethics, municipal transportation
system, municipal income tax, council salary scale, parks and recre
ation budget.

There vas a question for each of these policy areas.

^Charles H. Backstrom and Gerald D. Hursh, Survey Research
(Evanston: Northvestern University Press, 1963).
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Each question sought first to discover if the city had undertaken a
policy in that area and, secondly, if it had done so vithin the past
two years.

If the city did not have a particular policy, then in

formation vas sought as to vhether such a policy had been considered
by the city council vithin the past tvo years and its current status.
Appendix III contains a copy of this questionnaire.
Because of time limitations it vas not possible to pre-test
this questionnaire.

Hovever, due to its short length and self-explan

atory nature, it vas felt that the individual ansvering the questions
vould have little or no problem in completing it.

The results of the

questionnaire seem to indicate that this assumption vas basically
correct.

Hovever, individual questionnaires vere

oftentimes returned

vith little or no information being provided for certain policy areas.
There vere enough of these omissions to raise some doubt about the
design of the questionnaire.

But an examination of the questions

lacking complete responses failed to indicate any pattern of questions
or particular questions vhich vere not answered.

Most of the no

responses received vere felt to be due to inattention or lack of
readily available information on the part of the questionee.

Such

omission vould seem to be inherent in any mailed questionnaire in
vhich information is solicited from a source that does not have a
real interest in the results of the investigation and is responding
on a voluntary basis.
Measures of the Independent Variable
The independent variables used in the testing of the hypotheses
are socio-economic status, partisan affiliation and ideological
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identification, aspiration for higher partisan office and length of
council service of councils.

As pointed out in a preceeding para

graph, individual councilman provided information about themselves
in response to a mailed questionnaire.

To be usable here, the indi

vidual responses had to be combined into a measurement for each of the
councils.

Medians for individual councils for the variables of age,

income and years of council service vere determined.

Percentage

figures of various types vere computed for the other measures of the
independent variables.

This rav data vas then examined in detail to

establish categories that could be used in testing the hypotheses.
Age of the SES variable

vas measured by grouping the median

ages of the council into three groups— Young, Middle and Old.

The

median ages contained in the Young group vere those under forty-three
median years.

The Middle group’s median ages ranged from forty-three

to forty-eight.
group.

Forty-nine median years and older made up the Old

Table 1 presents the breakdovn of the median ages of the

council.
TABLE 1 —

MEDIAN AGES OF COUNCILS

Median Ages

Frequency

Young (less than 43)

11

Middle (43-48)

15

Old (greater than 49)
Total

8
34

Occupation of the council vas measured by determining the percentage
of the council that could be classified as professional/manager
(1,2,3) on the Backstrom and Hursh occupation classification group
ings.

Councils vhich vere over fifty percent professional/manager
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vere classified as Professional councils.
non-professional in occupation.

The others were viewed as

Table 2 displays the division of the

councils in Professional and Non-Professional.
TABLE 2 — PROFESSIONAL AND
NON-PROFESSIONAL COUNCILS
Occupation (Professional/Manager)

Frequency

Professional (greater than 50?c)

25

Non-professional (less than 50f c )

9

Total

34

Median income of the council was divided into three groups of Low,
Middle and High.

Low income was median income under $10,000.

income from $10,000 to $15,000 was viewed as Middle income.
median income over $15,000 vas classified as High income.

Median
Any

Table 3

exhibits this division of income.
TABLE 3 —

MEDIAN INCOME OF COUNCILS

Median Income

Frequency

Low (less than $10,000)

12

Medium ($10,000 to $15,000)

9

High (greater than $15,000)

13

Total

34

Partisan affiliation and ideological identification vere
measured separately.

Partisan affiliation vas measured by first deter

mining the percentage of the members of each council vho consistently
voted Democratic in partisan elections.

Those councils voting Demo

cratic more than forty percent of the time vere considered to be
Democratic.
cils.

Other councils vere

classified as Non-Democratic coun

This is shown in Table 4.
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TABLE 4 —

PARTISAN AFFILIATION

Partisan Affiliation

Frequency

Democratic (greater than40$)

15

Non-Democratic (less than 40$)

19

Total

34

Ideological identification vas measured to determine the proportion
of councilmen who viewed themselves as either liberal or conservative.
For purposes of measuring ideological identification moderates were
ignored.

If the results yielded a council where there vere more con

servatives than liberals then it was viewed as being Conservative.
In those cases where liberals were greater than conservatives the
council vas viewed as Liberal.

Where the conservatives and liberals

made up equal proportions of the council then it was classified as
Moderate.

Table 5 presents this classification.
TABLE 5 —

IDEOLOGICAL IDENTIFICATION

Ideological Identification

Frequency

Conservative (Conservative greater
than Liberals)
Moderate (Conservatives = Liberals)
Liberal (Liberals greater than
Conservatives)
Total

11
8
15
34

Aspiration for higher partisan office was indicated by in
dividual councilmen by a simple yes or no response.

If over forty

percent of the council responded with a positive reply, the council
as a whole was classified as having a High Aspiration.

Low Aspiration

vas displayed by those councils with less than a forty percent "yes"
response.

Aspiration is shown in Table 6.
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TABLE 6 —

ASPIRATION FOR HIGHER PARTISAN OFFICE

Aspiration

Frequency

High (greater than40^)

14

Lov (lessthan 40/5)

20

Total

34

Table 7 presents the length of service of the council.
Length of service vas originally measured by median years served for
each council.

Those councils vhere the median years served vere over

tvo terms vere considered to have Long Service.

Tvo terms or less

vere classified as Short Service.
TABLE 7 —

LENGTH OF COUNCIL SERVICE

Length

Frequency

Long (greater than tvo terms)

16

Short (less than tvo terms)

18

Total

34

In those fev cases vhere median measures of the independent
variable vere available from the original data, they vere ranked so
they could be used vith the partial measure of a dependent variable
that vas interval data.
Measures of the Dependent Variables
Of the eleven possible dependent variables that vere ori
ginally suggested, nine vere ultimately selected and used in the
testing of the hypotheses.

They vere:

the existence of a Federal

urban reneval program, the existence of a local urban reneval program,
the establishment of a citizen police reviev board, the enactment of
an open housing ordinance, the establishment of a human relations
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commission, the fluoridation of public water supply, the enactment
of a municipal income tax, an increase in the council salary scale,
and a change in the parks and recreation budget.
The eleven dependent variables were originally chosen for two
principle reasons:

the failure of other output variables in previous

investigations and the nature of the independent variables utilized
in this study.

In most of the studies reviewed in Chapter One, one

principle type of output measure was utilized— some sort of revenue
or expenditure item.

They were found related to the political system

in only the Lineberrv and Fowler research which suggested that sub
stantive policy choices might better serve as a measure of outputs
than fiscal measures.

Strengthening this belief in policy choices

was the nature of the independent variables.

It was felt that these

variables would be more directly related to policy choices than fiscal
measures because fiscal measures, for at least the short run period
of this study, are tied to environmental factors (tax base, economic
conditions,etc.) which are beyond the control of those holding office.
Thus, while authorities might decide policy choices, they would likely
be restricted from making significant fiscal changes in a two year
period.

Only nine of the original eleven were used because two

measures were found not to have been considered during the time in
question by any of the councils studied.
With the single exception of the question about the parks and
recreation budget, the other questions sought first to determine if
any action had been taken in the policy area and, secondly, what, if
any, action the present council had taken.

This resulted in two
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measures for each policy output.

One shoving whether or not any

action had been taken by the present council.

The second describing

the type of action taken by the present council.

Any action that might

have been previously taken by former councils was removed from the
first measure to prevent it from being mistakenly included as a cur
rent council action.
The parks and recreation measurement differed from the others
because it only measured the change that had occurred within the city's
budget in the past tvo years.
parts:

This measure was divided into three

an increase in the budget for parks and recreation, no change

in the budget, or a decrease in the budget.

These categories vere

obtained by collapsing the original five measured.

(See Appendix III).

Those cities with greatly increased budgets were considered to have
an Increased Budget.
et

No Change indicates a situation where the budg

was only slightly increased or no change vas made in it, thus

basically maintaining the same level of services over the past two
years.

The last two original categories vere considered to be de

creases in the park and recreation budget.
TABLE 8 —

This can be seen in Table 8.

PARKS AND RECREATION BUDGET

Change in budget

Frequency

Increase (1)

18

No Change (2,3)

14

Decrease (4,5)

2

Total

34

The other eight policy measures were divided into a no-action/
action measure to separate those councils having taken some type of
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action vithin the present term and those vho have not.

As previously

mentioned, in those cases where action took place under a previous
council the action vas removed from the total figure of action taken.
The normal division of council action vas into three categories—
rejection of the policy, discussion of the policy, and approval of
the policy by the present council.

Any output not noted in the

following exceptions follows this measurement pattern.

Federal urban

reneval follows the normal pattern with the inclusion of an additional
measure of per capita expenditure for federal

urban reneval.

action taken in open housing vas divided into

four instead of the

usual three categories:

The

rejection, discussion, enactment of ordinance,

and enactment of ordinance with the establishment of an Open Housing
Commission.

Statistics

The statistics necessary to test the hypotheses are limited
in number and scope because of the small sample size and the low
level of measurement that is being dealt with

in this study.

The

majority of statistical tests selected were for nominal and ordinal
data.

Table 9 lists the statistical tests that were selected for use

with the appropriate type of data.
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TABLE 9 —

STATISTICAL TESTS

Type of data
Nominal

Statistics used
X Nominal

Lambda a

2

Chi-square
Nominal

X Ordinal

3

Lambda a
Chi-square

Ordinal

X Nominal

Lambda a
n

Ordinal X Ordinal

hi-square

Lambda a
4
Gamma

Tates correction was applied to all Chi-square tests because expected
frequencies of less than five vere found in each test performed.
From this discussion of methodology, it is well to keep in
mind certain important points.

First, the nature of the sample must

necessarily have an important bearing on the results of the analysis
made.

The lack of a one hundred percent response on each council

weakens the strength of the independent variable and may, in fact,
color the results.

The use of policy measures different from those

previously7 selected by other studies means that evidence is lacking
in exactly what results one would expect from them.

Finally, the size

of the sample has direct influence on the selection of the statistical
tests and their possible outcomes.

These points should be kept in

mind in Chapter 3— Analysis of Data.

2
Linton C. Freeman, Elementary Applied Statistics: For Students
in Behavioral Science (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1965),
^Ibid., pp. 215-226.
4Ibid., pp. 82-87.
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ANALYSIS OF DATA
Hypotheses
This chapter is an analysis of the results of the data
gathered and tested.

As an aid in this analysis the background that

led to the development of the hypotheses will be reviewed.

Using the

modified Eastoniar. system's model developed earlier, we are concerned
with the relationship of authorities who make up the authority struc
ture of the political system to the outputs of the system.

Past

findings by other political scientists seem to indicate that environ
ment rather than any variable of the political system influences out
put.

Having rejected this conclusion, it was suggested that the

relationship between authority characteristics and outputs would be
worthy of further testing.
Four specific hypotheses were formulated.

The direction of

the relationship between the variables in these hypotheses was not
given because of the lack of previously reported research into author
ity characteristics and to the overall exploratory nature of this
study.

The hypotheses are as follows:
1.

SES authority characteristics are significantly related
to the following outputs:
a)

Policies insuring equal rights for all groups
living in the community.

b)

Policies benefiting particular segments of the
community'.

c)

Increase in council salary schedule.
31
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d) Enactment of municipal income

tax.

e) Fluoridation of water supply.
2.

Partisan affiliation and ideological identification of
authorities are significantly related to the following
outputs:
a)

Policies insuring equal rights for all groups
living in the community.

b)

Policies benefiting particular segments of the
community.

3.

c)

Increase in council salary schedule.

d)

Enactment of municipal income

e)

Fluoridation of water supply.

tax.

Aspiration for higher partisan office held by authorities
is significantly related to the following outputs:
a)

Policies insuring equal rights for all groups
living in the community.

b)

Policies benefiting particular segments of the
community.

c)
4.

Increase in council salary schedule.

Length of service of authorities is significantly related
to the following outputs:
a)

Policies insuring equal rights for all groups
living in the community.

b)

Increase in council salary schedule.

c)

Enactment of municipal income tax.

Each individual hypothesis will be analyzed separately with its
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appropriate data.

With the completion of this analysis, the conclusions

that can be drawn from the data will be presented in Chapter 4.

Hypothesis One
Hypothesis One suggested that socio-economic status of the
authorities vould be significantly related to certain outputs.

In

testing this hypothesis, socio-economic status (age. occupation and
income) was subjected to certain statistical tests to determine if
they were related to outputs of policies of equal rights for all
groups living in the community, policies benefiting particular seg
ments of the community, increases in council salary scale, enactment
of a municipal income tax and fluoridation of the water supply.
The relationship of socio-economic status to policies insuring
equal rights for all groups vas tested by subjecting each component
of SES— age, income and occupation— to the measures of equal rights
policies obtained.

These measures were the establishment of a citizen

police review board, enactment of an open housing ordinance and the
establishment of a human relations commission.

The testing of each

relationship found no significant relationship existing between the
variables.

Socio-economic status of authorities is not related to

policies insuring equal rights for all groups living within the com
munity.

The strongest relationship found is shown in Table 1, where

income of authorities is related to enactment of an open housing
ordinance.
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TABLE 1 —

Relation of Council Income to Enactment
of Open Housing Ordinance
Income of Council

Open Housing Ordinance

Low

Middle

No Action

3

5

Action

6

2

X2 = 2.26

Chi-square is not significant.

n.i .gh
2

Lambda a = 0.30

There is some improved predictability

(lambda a) in knowing whether any action on the policy has been taken
by a council when the level of income of that council is known.
values of the other tests are given in Table 2.

The

Appendix IV contains

the various tables which display the data from which these tests
were made and all other data which is not given in this section.

TABLE 2 —

Results of Statistical Tests of SES and
policies insuring equal rights
Socio-economic Status

Policies Insuring Equal Rights

Age

Income

Occupation

.2
X

a

X'

Citizen Police Review Board 0.0

1.17

0.0

0.13

0.0

0.00

Open Housing Ordinance

0.0

0.23

0.30 2.26

0.0

0.22

Human Relations Commission

0.0

0.40

0.0

0.0

0.08

0.38

The second relationship tested was authority socio-economic
status and policies benefiting particular segments of the community.
Age, income and occupation were related to policies measured by the
existence of a Federal urban renewal program, existence of a local
urban renewal program and change in the parks and recreation budget.
No significant relationship between these variables was found.

The-

strongest association found was between occupation or income and the
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existence of a Federal urban renewal program.

Tables 3 and 4

present these results.

TABLE 3 —

Relation of Council Occupation to
Federal Urban Reneval Program
Occupation

Federal Urban Reneval Program

Professional

No Action

14

2

8

7

Action
X

2

TABLE 4 —

=3 . 0 2

Non-Professional

Lambda a -- 0.3C

Relation of Council Income to
Federal Urban Reneval Program
Income

Federal Urban Reneval Program

Lov

Middle

No Action

5

7

Action

7

1

X

=3.30

High

Lambda a = 0.26

In both examples Chi-square is not significant.

Knowledge of the

independent variable does increase predictability of the dependent
variable as shown by the respective lambda a's.

Knowledge that a

council's occupation is professional is predictive of no action
by that council on a federal urban renewal program.

In a similar

manner, knowledge of a council's income increases the predicability
that action will be taken on federal urban reneval by those councils
with high or low income while those with middle income will take
no action.
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TABLE 5 — Results of Statistical Tests of SES and
Policies Benefiting Particular Segments of the Community
Socio-economic Status
Policies Benefiting Particular
Segments of the Community

Age

A

a

Income

A

X2

Federal Urban Reneval

0.20 0.28

Local Urban Reneval

0.08 0.95

Aa

X2

0,26

3.30 0.30

3,02

0.00

0.06 0.08
*
0.24 0,00

1.46

a

*
Parks and Recreation Budget

0.07 -.39

Occupation

0.00

X2

0.76

This figure is thg value of a Gamma
test rather than X . It is not
statistically significant.
The third dependent variable to be tested vith SES vas increase
in council salary schedule.

Age, income and occupation vere tested

directly against any increase in council salary schedule.

No relation

ship vas' found to be significant.

Income and occupation displayed the

strongest relationship exhibited.

Tables 6, 7 and 8 present the data

from vhich these tests vere made.

TABLE 6 —

Relation of Council Income to Increase
in Council Salary Schedule
Income

Increase in Council Salary Schedule
No Action
Action
X

2

=4.45

Lov

Middle

High

2

4

8

9

4

4

Lambda a = 0.29

TABLE 7 — Relation of Council Occupation to
Increase in Council Salary Schedule
Occupation
Increase in Council Salary Schedule
No Action
Action
X

2

=3.04

Professional

Non-Professional

13

1

10

7

Lambda a = 0.29
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TABLE 8 —

Relation of Council Age to Increase
in Council Salary Schedule
Age

Increase in Council Salary Schedule

Young

Middle

Old

5

4

5

5

10

2

No Action
Action
X

2

= 1.95

Lambda a = 0.21

Knowledge of council income (low), council occupation (non-profes
sional) and council age (middle) improves the predictability of
action by a council in increasing the council's salary schedule.
Council's age is the weakest predictor of action as well as display
ing the weakest association to increase in salary schedule.
Enactment of a municipal income tax was tested directly with
socio-economic status.

Neither age, income, nor occupation was found

to be significantly related to enactment of a municipal income tax.
There was no increased predictability by knowing any of the inde
pendent variables.

The values of these tests are contained in

Table 9.

TABLE 9 —

Results of Statistical Tests of SES and
Enactment of a Municipal Income Tax
Socio-economic Status

Enactment of Municipal Income Tax

Age

Income

A a
0.0

1.11

Occupation

Aa

X^

A a

X^

0.0

0.52

0.0

1.14

The final dependent variable to be associated to age, income
and occupation vas fluoridation of the water supply.
nificant relationship was found to exist.

Again no sig

Knowledge of income did

improve predictability of council action of fluoridation of the water
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supply— high and middle income councils took action while low income
council did not.

Table 10 presents the relationship between income

and fluoridation.

TABLE 10 —

Relation of Council income to Fluoridation
of Water Supply
Income

Fluoridation of Water Supply

Low

Action
No Action
o
X“ = 1.39

Middle

High

3

5

5

6

1

2

Lambda a =0.33

The results of the other tests are shown in Table 11

TABLE 11 —

Results of Statistical Tests of SES and
Fluoridation of Water Supply
Socio-economic Status

Fluoridation of Water Supply

Age
A a
0.0

Occupation
X~
0.36

A a ____
0.0

0.0

In these tests of socio-economic status with measures of
equal^rights policies, certain improvements in prediction of council
action were noted.

Knowledge of council income improved the pre

diction of action by a council toward policies of open housing ordi
nances. federal urban renewal program, increase in council salary
schedule and fluordination.

In each example the improvement in

predicability found was .29 or greater using Guttman's coefficient
of predictability.

Improvement in prediction of council action

knowing the council's occupation was achieved with federal urban
renewal program and increase in council salary schedules.
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The values

39
of the improvements were .30 and .29 respectively.

Knowledge of age

improved predictability of council action with only one policy-increase
in council salary schedule.

The lambda a found was .21.

While it

appears that knowledge of a council's occupation is more important
in predicting action than income and income more than age, it is not
safe to conclude that this is so.

No relationship found here can be

regarded as anything other than a random chance event because no
statistical test was significant in this first hypothesis.

Hypothesis Two

Partisan affiliation and ideological identification of author
ities were suggested as being significantly related to outputs of
policies insuring equal rights, policies benefiting particular seg
ments of the community, increase in council salary schedule, enactment
of a municipal income tax and fluoridation of the water supply.

As

in the first hypothesis, partisan affiliation and ideological identi
fication will be examined individually with each dependent variable.
Measures of policies insuring equal rights for all in the
community include the enactment of a citizen police review board, the
enactment of an open housing ordinance and the establishment of a
human relations commissions.

In each measure, no significant re

lationship was found to exist between it and partisan affiliation or
ideological identification.

The strongest associations found were

between ideological identification and two measures of the dependent
variables— enactment of open housing ordinance and establishment of
a human relations commission.

Tables 12 and 13 present these findings.
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TABLE 12 — Relation of Ideological Identification of Council
to Enactment of Open Housing Ordinance
Ideological Identification
Enactment of Open Housing Ordinance

Liberal

Moderate

Conservative

No Action

4

2

5

Action

2

6

2

= 1.69

TABLE 13 —

Lambda a = 0 . 2

Relation of Ideological Identification of
Council to Establishment of a Human Relations
Counc il
Ideological Identification

Establishment of a Human Relations
__________ Counc il_________________
No Action
Action
o
X“ = 5.0

Liberal

Moderate

Conservative

5

0

6

3

3

0

Lambda a =0.33

The predictability of action by a council in enacting an open housing
ordinance or establishing a human relations commission is increased
vhen the ideological identification of the council is knovn.

Knov-

ledge that the council identification is either liberal or con
servative is predictive of no action while a moderate council is
predictive of action.

Table 14 presents the values of the other tests

of the dependent variable.
is contained in Appendix V.

The data from vhich these tests vere made
This appendix also contains any sub

sequent data for tests vhich are not presented in this section.
The second dependent variable to be related to partisan af
filiation and ideological identification vas policies benefiting
particular segments of the community.

These policies vere measured

bv the existence of a Federal urban reneval program, existence of a
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local urban renewal program and changes in the parks and recreation
budget.

Xo statistically significant relationship was found to exist.

Predictability was not markedly increased when partisan affiliation
or ideological identification of the council was known.

The results

of the various tests are shown in Table 15.

TABLE 14 —

Results of Statistical Tests of Partisan
Affiliation and Ideological Identification
and Policies Insuring Equal Rights
Partisan
Affiliation
A a

Policies Insuring Equal Rights

X2

Ideological
Identification
A a

X

Citizen Police Review Board

0.0

C.18

0.0

1 .25

Open Housing Ordinance

0.09

0.66

0.2

1 .69

Human Relations Commission

0.0

0.14

0.33

5.0

TABLE 15 —

Results of Statistical Tests of Partisan
Affiliation and Ideological Identification
and Policies Benefiting Particular Segments
of the Community
Partisan
Affiliation

Policies Benefiting Particular
Segments of the Community

Ideological
Identification
0

Aa

X2

A a

X“

Federal Urban Reneval

0.0

0.02

0.07

0.1

Local Urban Reneval

0.0

0.28

0.08

0.34

Parks and Recreation Budget

0.06

0.14

0.16

■0.48*

■if

This figure is the valu| of a
Gamma test rather than X . It
is not statistically significani

Increase in council salary schedule is not significantly related to either partisan affiliation or ideological identification.
However, the values obtained from ideological identification is the
closest to being significant of all those that have been given.
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There

is improved predictability of the action of the council toward in
crease of council salary schedule when partisan affiliation or
ideological identification is known.

Action on increase of salary

schedules is predicted when Democratic partisan affiliation of council
is known.

Knowledge that a council's ideological identification is

liberal improves the predicability that action will be taken on an
increase in council salary schedule.

The values of the tests of the

independent and dependent variables are shown in Tables 16 and 17.

TABLE 16 —

Relation of Partisan Affiliation of Council
+o Increase in Council Salary Schedule
Partisan Affiliation

Increase in Council Salary Schedule

Democratic

No Action
Action
X

TABLE 17 —

2

=2.02

Non-Democratic

3

11

9

8

Lambda a = 0.21

Relation of Ideological Identification of
Council to Increase in Council Salary Schedule
Ideological Identification

Increase in Council Salary
Schedule__________________

Liberal

Moderate

Conservative

No Action

1

5

8

Action

9

3

5

X2 = 5 . 8 2

Lambda a = 0 , 3 6

Enactment of a municipal income tax is the fourth dependent
variable to be related to the independent variables.

Partisan af

filiation and ideological identification were found to be unrelated
statistically to enactment of a municipal income tax.

No improve

ment in predictability toward enactment of the income tax was found
to exist.

The results of the tests are shown in Table 18.
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TABLE 18 —

Results of Statistical Tests of Partisan
Affiliation and Ideological Identification
of Council and Enactment of a Municipal
Income Tax
Partisan
Affiliation

Enactment of Municipal Income Tax

Ideological
Identification

Aa

X*~

A

0.0

0.22

0.0

a______X
0.56

The final dependent variable to be tested vith partisan affil
iation and ideological identification vas fluoridation of the vater
supply.

As vith every other variable so far tested, no significant

relationship vas found to exist.

Some improvement in predictability

did occur vith knovledge of the independent variables.

Table 19

presents the results of the statistical tests.

TABLE 19 —

Results of Statistical Tests of Partisan
Affiliation and Ideological Identification
of Council and Fluoridation of Vater Supply
Partisan
Affiliation

Fluoridation of Water Supply

Ideological
Identif ication

A a____ A a_____________ X~~
0.22

1.51

0.11

0.28

Knovledge of the ideological identification improved pre
diction of action or not action by a council on enactment of an open
housing ordinance, establishment of a human relations commission,
the three measures of policies benefiting particular segments of the
community, increase in council salary schedule and fluoridation of
vater supply.

At the same time, partisan affiliation improved pre

diction on open housing ordinance, parks and recreation budget,
increase in the council salary schedule and fluoridation of the
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vater supply.

While council ideological identification appears to

have more predicative povers than partisan affiliation, no conclusions
can be drawn because no test vas found to be statistically significant
Thus, these results could have been achieved by random chance.

Hypothesis Three

The independent variable— aspiration for higher partisan
office— vas proposed as being significantly related to three dependent
variables.

They vere policies insuring equal rights for all groups

living in the community, policies benefiting particular segments of
the community and increase in council

salary schedule.

of policies insuring equal rights are

the same as those used previousl

in Hypothesis One and Two.

The measures

No significant relationship vas found to

exist between the independent variable and measures of the dependent
variable nor vas there any increased predictability of council action
by knovledge of aspiration for higher

partisan office.

This can be

seen in Table 20.

TABLE 20 —

Results of Statistical Tests of Aspiration
for Higher Office by Council and Policies
Insuring Equal Rights
Aspiration'for Higher
Partisan Office

Policies Insuring Equal Rights

A a________ ______

Citizen Police Review Board

0.0

0.40

Open Housing Ordinance

0.0

0.12

Human Relations Commission

0.0

0.16

Appendix VI contains the data for these tests and all other tests for
vhich data is not presented in this section.
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As in the first dependent variable, aspiration for higher
partisan office was found to be statistically unrelated to the
second— policies benefiting particular segments of the community.
Policies benefiting particular segments were measured by the exist
ence of a Federal urban renewal program, existence of a local urban
renewal program and changes in the parks and recreation budget.

No

improvement in predictability was shown by knowledge of the council's
aspiration.

Table 21 displays the results of the various tests.

TABLE 21 —

Results of Statistical Tests of Aspiration
for Higher Office by Council and Policies
Benefiting Particular Segments of the Community
Aspiration for Higher
Partisan Office

Policies Benefiting Particular
Segments of the Community

2

A a____________X

Federal Urban Renewal

0.0

0.05

Local Urban Renewal

0.0

0.05

Parks and Recreation Budget

0.0

0.75

Increase in council salary schedule is the final dependent var
iable to be tested vith aspiration for higher partisan office.
significant relationship vas found to exist.

No

There is one increased

predictability of the council's action toward increase in council
salary schedule vith knovledge of aspiration for higher partisan office.
Knowledge that a council has a high aspiration for higher partisan
office is predictive that the council will take action on an increase
in the council salary schedule.

Yet this cannot be considered con

clusive because Chi-square is insignificant and thus the improvement
noted could have occurred by chance.

These results are shown in

Table 22.
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TABLE 22 —

Relation of Aspiration for Higher Partisan
Office by Council and Increase in Council
Salary Schedule
Aspiration for Higher
Partisan Office __
Low

High

Increase in Council Salary Schedule

12

No Action

8

8

Action

Lambda a = 0.29

X" =2. 83

Hypothesis Four

This hypothesis suggested that the length of service of author
ities is significantly related to the variables of policies insuring
equal rights for all groups living in the community, increase in coun
cil salary schedule and enactment of municipal income tax.

Length of

service was not found to be statistically* significant with policies
insuring equal rights.

No increased predictability about council

action on these policies could be made with information about the
length of service of the council.
variables is shown in Table 23.

The results of the test of the
Appendix VII contains the data for

these tests.

TABLE 23 —

Results of Statistical Tests of Length of
Service of Council and Policies Insuring
Equal Rights
Length of Service

Policies Insuring Equal Rights

A a________

Citizen Police Review Board

0.0

0.29

Open Housing Ordinance

0.0

0.09

Human Relations Commission

0.0

0.13
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Increase in council salary schedule is not significantly as
sociated with length of council service.

Knowledge of this length

does not increase the predictability of council action toward an in
crease in salary schedule.

TABLE 24 —

Table 24 presents the data and tests.

Relation of Length of Council Service and
Increase in Council Salary Schedule
Length of Service

Increase in Council Salary Schedule

Short

No Action
Action
X

2

=0.04

Long

7

7

8

9

Lambda a = 0.0

The final dependent variable in this hypothesis was enactment
of amunicipal

income tax.

are notstatistically

Length of council service

related.

andthis variabl

As in the first two dependent variable

no increase in predictability of action occurs when length of service
was known.

This is shown in

TABLE 25 —

Table 25.

Relation of Lengthof CouncilService and
Enactment of Municipal Income Tax
Length of Service

Enactment of Municipal Income Tax
No Action
Action
o
X- =0.22

Short

Long

1

1

8

5

Lambda a = 0 . 0

The meaning of the results found and the conclusions that can
be drawn from this study are presented in Chapter 4.
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CONCLUSION
Problem and Hypotheses
An effort has been made here to locate a political factor that
vas significantly related to outputs at the municipal level of govern
ment.

To this end, characteristics of those authorities who make up

the authority structure of the political system were investigated to
determine if they were significantly associated with the policy
choices of local government.

Four hypotheses were suggested as being

worthy of testing in this pursuit.

The first hypothesis proposed

that the socio-economic status of authorities would be related to five
different outputs— policies insuring equal rights for all groups liv
ing in the community, policies benefiting particular segments of the
community, increase in council salary schedule, enactment of municipal
income tax and fluoridation of the water supply.

Partisan affiliation

and ideological identification in the second hypothesis were posited
as affecting the same five outputs contained in the first hypothesis.
The third hypothesis advanced the proposition that aspiration for
higher partisan office was significantly related to policies insuring
equal rights for all living in the community, policies benefiting
particular segments of the community and an increase in council salary
schedule.

The length of service of authorities was the independent

variable in the final hypothesis which suggested that it was associated
with outputs of policies insuring equal rights for all groups living
in the community, increase in council schedule and enactment of mu
nicipal income tax.
48
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Findings from Data

The result of testing these hypotheses was found to be the
same in each case.

No significant relationships were found to exist

between the independent and dependent variable of the hypotheses.
The strongest associations were found in the first and second hy
potheses.

In the first hypothesis, occupation of the authorities dis

played some strength with one of the measures of policies benefiting
segments of the community (federal urban renewal program) and an in
crease in council salary schedule.

Income of authorities and an

increase in council salary schedule was the other relationship in
the first hypothesis which exhibited some strength.
Ideological identification in the second hypothesis came
fairly close to being significantly related to one measure of policies
insuring equal rights (establishment of a human rights commission)
and to an increase in council salary schedule.

The latter association

came the closest to being significant of all of those studied.

Chi-

square in this test measured 5.82 when significance would have been
achieved at 5.99 with two degrees of freedom.
Though no significant relationships were found, a number of
instances occurred in testing the hypotheses where increased pre
dictability (Lambda a) of council action towards a particular
policy was found when knowledge of the independent variable was
known.

For example, if one arbitrarily takes increased predict

ability of over twenty-five percent, it is found that knowledge
of income of the council helps predicate council action towards pol
icies of equal rights (open housing ordinance), policies benefiting

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

particular segments (federal urban renewal program) increase in
council salary schedule and fluoridation of the water supply.
Occupation of authorities is useful in predicting action towards
policies benefiting particular segments (federal urban renewal pro
gram) and an increase in council salary schedule.

Council action

regarding the policies of equal rights (establishment of human re
lations commissions) and an increase in council salary schedule could
be better predicted with knowledge of council ideological identification.
Knowledge of the council's aspiration for higher partisan office
improved predictability of action in only one case— increase in coun
cil salary schedule.

Comments on Findings

It is clear from the results obtained that the basic hy
pothesis that authority characteristics of the political system do
influence outputs is not supported.

At the same time it is not

possible to conclude that the situation found is similar to others
where environment was the prime determinate of outputs.

There is

nothing to suggest that the findings here provide support for the
position of Kofferbert, Dye. Sherbenou, Downes or Froman.

First,

environment did not directly enter into the hypotheses tested as it
did in their investigation.

Secondly, vastly different types of

measures of the independent and dependent variables were utilized, thus
weakening any comparison that can be made between their work and that
performed here.

Lastly, the lack of positive findings here does not

alter the fact that their environmental variables fail to explain all
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of the variance found in outputs and this unexplained variance continues
to suggest that other variables exist which L?.ve some influence upon
output.
Although it is not possible to state conclusively why no author
ity characteristic was found to be significantly associated with any
output studied, several reasons for this situation may be suggested.
As was pointed out early in this study, the nature of the sample pre
sented a problem from the beginning.
totaling thirty-nine Ohio cities.

This sample was a small sample

Anytime a study begins with a small

sample, as this one did, statistically significant relationships are
more difficult to obtain because of the necessity of using small
sample statistics.
In each council making up the sample, the median return of the
instrument measuring council authority characteristics was seventyone percent.

This meant that approximately one-half the councils

were represented by only fifty to seventy percent of their membership—
thereby making it considerably more difficult to differentiate be
tween the various councils studied, and thus introducing the possi
bility of error when placing them into categories.

Another factor

contributing to this difficulty in differentiation among councils was
the fact that the data about the councilmen was gathered for another
study which was not directly concerned with the relationships studied
here.

Hence, it is quite likely that the authority characteristic

measures used in this investigation did not accurately reflect the
nature of the councils because of the necessity of creating classifactory schemes from the secondary data source which did not measure
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certain characteristics as directly as would have been preferred.
The necessity of studying only a two year period of council
action contributed to the difficulty in measuring the dependent
variables.

This meant that all action that occurred on a policy

measure prior to the start of the study had to be removed from the
data gathered.

In many cases this reduced the number of councils

under consideration to a very few which made it increasingly difficult
to obtain a statistically significant relationship.

In numerous in

stances the necessity of removing prior action also eliminated what
ever action had been taken by any council on a particular policy thus
leaving a situation where only "no action" by councils would appear.

Recommendations

The lack of any positive findings does not necessarily inval
idate the theory underlying this study.

The limitations previously

discussed could have made it highly improbable that any significant
relationships would be found.

Thus, because this effort was undertaken

as an exploratory study into the nature of authority characteristics
and outputs, it is proposed that a more complete and extensive investi
gation be conducted to further test the theory developed.

To overcome

some of the handicaps of this study, a larger sample should initially
be drawn from some larger universe which might help dispose of some of
the statistically related problems.

Once this larger sample has been

determined, complete measurements of each council should be made.
Councils should not be included in the new undertaking unless they
represent completely all those who make up the council.

This way the
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composite data for a council will truly reflect the composition of
that council.

The time frame for the study must be longer to develop

a more realistic picture of council action.

Two years is not a long

period of time in the life of the community and the council vhich re
presents it but once a week.

Perhaps a four year period would provide

a more adequate period cf time to study outputs.

This longer period

of time might increase the difficulty in measuring authority character
istics because the councils would have to be measured twice and allow
ances made for any change that had occurred in them.

However, this

would not present an over-burdensome task and it just might develop a
more adequate and realistic measure of both the independent and de
pendent variables.
Although this particular investigation has not contributed
anything positive to an understanding of political variables and their
influences upon outputs at the municipal level, it has shown itself
useful and helpful as a pilot study in illuminating some of the pit
falls that confront an investigation such as this.

Several relation

ships were found to be approaching significance and some increase
predictability of action was obtained through knowledge of certain of
the independent variables.

This leads to the belief that this under

taking was not wasted and may yet serve to make some contribution to
our understanding of local government, however indirect it may be.
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APPENDIX I

SAMPLE OF OHIO CITIES OVER 25.000 POPULATION

City

City Identification Code

Akron

486

Allianee

487

Barberton

488

Canton

489

Cine innati

490

Dayton

495

East Cleveland

496

Euclid

498

Findlay

499

Hamilton

501

Kettering

502

Lakewood

503

Lima

505

Lorain

596

Mansfield

507

Maple Heights

508

Marion

509

Massillon

510

Middletown

511

Newark

512
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Parma

514

Sandusky

516

Shaker Heights

517

Springfield

519

Steubenville

520

Toledo

521

Upper Arlington

522

Warren

523

Ashtabula

710

Chillicothe

701

Fairborn

702

Mentor

703

North Olmstead

704

Whitehall

706
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APPENDIX II

AUTHORITY CHARACTERISTICS QUESTIONS

3.

Age

()

20 to 24

()

25 to 29

( )

30 to 34

()

35 to 39

( )

40 to 44

( )

45 to 49

()

50 to 54

()

55 to 69

( )

60 to 64

( )

65 or over

4.

Occupation ____________________________ _

5.

Yearly income (less compensation for public office)
( )

S 3,000 to S 4,999

()

$ 5,000 to S 6,999

( )

S 7,000 to $ 8,999

()

S 9,000 to $10,999

( )

$11,000 to $14,999

()

$15,000 or over

6.

How long have you held your seat on the council?__________

7.

In PARTISAN elections, do you normally vote:
A straight Democratic ticket?
A split ticket but for more Democrats than Republicans
A split ticket equally divided between the tvo parties
A split ticket but for more Republicans than Democrats
A straight Republican ticket?

8,

Please place an X on the scale below which you think best demon
strates your political beliefs.
Liberal

22.

Moderate

Conservative

Have you any intention at this time for seeking higher PARTISAN
public office in the future?

(

)

Yes

(

)

56
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No

57

BACKSTROM AND HURSH
OCCUPATION CLASSIFICATIONS

1 . Professional, technical, and kindred workers. Includes Ac
countants; Actors; Airplane pilots and navigators; Architects; Artists;
Athletes; Auditors; Authors; Chemists; Chiropractors; Clergymen; Col
lege presidents, professors, and instructors; Conservationists; Danc
ers; Dentists; Designers; Dietitians; Draftsmen; Editors; Embalmers;
Entertainers; Farm management advisors; Foresters; Funeral directors;
Healers; Home management advisors; Judges; Lawyers; Librarians; Musi
cians; Natural scientists; Nutritionists; Optometrists; Osteopaths;
Personnel workers; Pharmacists; Photographers; Physicians; Professional
nurses; Radio operators; Recreation workers; Religious workers; Report
ers; Social scientists; Social workers; Sports instructors and offi
cials; Student professional nurses; Surgeons; Surveyors; Teachers;
Technical engineers; Therapists; Veterinarians.
2. Farmers and farm managers.
sharecroppers.

Includes tenant farmers and

3. Managers, officials and proprietors, except farm. Includes
Buyers; Building superintendents: Credit men; Lodge officials; Post
masters: Public administration officials; Purchasing agents; Railroad
conductors; Ship officers, pilots, pursers and engineers; Shippers of
farm products; Union officials.
4. Clerical and kindred workers. Includes Bank tellers; Bill
and account collectors; Bookkeepers; Cashiers; Dentist's office at
tendants; Express agents; Express messengers; Library assistants and
attendants; Mail carriers; Messengers; Office boys; Office machine
operators; Physician's office attendants; Railway mail clerks; Receiv
ing clerks; Secretaries; Shipping clerks; Station agents; Stenogra
phers; Telegraph messengers; Telegraph operators; Telephone operators;
Ticket agents; Typists.
5. Sales Workers. Includes Advertising agents and salesmen;
Auctioneers; Demonstrators; Hucksters; Insurance agents and brokers;
Newsboys; Peddlers; Real estate agents and brokers; Stock and bond
salesmen.
6 . Craftsmen, foremen and kindred workers. Includes An
nealers; Bakers; Blacksmiths; Boilermakers; Bookbinders; Brickmasons;
Cabinetmakers; Carpenters; Cement finishers; Compositors; Concrete
finishers; Coppersmiths; Cranemen; Derrickmen; Diemakers; Die setters;
Electricians; Electrotypers; Engravers; Excavating machinery operators;
Forgemen; Glaziers; Goldsmiths; Grading machinery operators; Heat
treaters; Hoistmen; Lens grinders and polishers; Lithographers; Loco
motive engineers; Locomotive firemen; Log and lumber scalers and graders;
Loom fixers; Machinists; Mechanics; Metal molders; Metal rollers;
Metal roll hands; Millers; Millwrights; Motion picture projectionists;
Opticians; Organ tuners; Painters (construction and maintenance); Paper-
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hangers; Photoengravers; Piano tuners; Pipe fitters; Plasterers;
Plate printers; Plumbers; Power linemen and servicemen; Garage laborers
Groundskeepers; Longshoremen; Oystermen; Metal workers; Shoemakers, ex
cept in factories; Silversmiths; Slaters; Stationary engineers; Stereotypers; Stone carvers; Stone cutters; Stonemasons; Structural metal
workers; Tailors; Telegraph and Telephone linemen and servicemen; Tile
setters; Tinsmiths; Tool makers; Typesetters; Upholsterers; Watchmakers
Window dressers.
7. Operatives and kindred workers. Includes Apprentices; As
bestos workers; Auto service attendants; Blasters; Boatmen; Bus con
ductors and drivers; Canalmen; Chauffeurs; Deck hands; Deliverymen;
Dressmakers; Dry cleaning operatives; Dyers; Fruit, nut and vegetable
graders and packers; Furnacemen; Insulation workers; Laundry opera
tives; Meat cutters; Metal filers, grinders and polishers; Metal
heaters; Milliners; Mine operatives and laborers; Motormen; Painters
(except construction and maintenance); Parking lot attendants; Photo
graphic process workers; Powdermen; Power station operators; Railroad
brakemen and switchmen; Routemen; Sailors; Sawyers; Seamstresses;
Smeltermen; Stationary firemen; Street railway conductors; Surveying
tenmen, rodmen and axmen; Taxicab drivers; Textile spinners; Textile
weavers; Tractor drivers; Truck drivers; Welders.
8. Private household workers.
dresses in private households.

Includes housekeepers and laun

9. Service workers, except private household. Includes At
tendants and ushers in amusement places; Bailiffs; Barbers; Bartenders;
Beauticians; Boarding house keepers; Bootblacks; Bridge tenders; Char
women; Cooks, except in private households; Detectives; Doorkeepers;
Elevator operators; Firemen (fire protection); Fountain workers;
Guards; Hospital attendants; Janitors; Lodginghouse keepers; Mani
curists; Marshals; Midwives; Policemen; Porters; Practical nurses;
Sextons; Sheriffs; Stewards; Waiters; Watchmen.
10. Farm Laborers and foremen. Includes both paid and unpaid
family farm laborers, and self-employed farm service laborers.
11. Laborers, except farm and mine. Includes Car washers;
Fishermen; Garage laborers; Groundskeepers; Longshoremen; Oystermen;
Raftsmen; Stevedores; Teamsters; Woodchoppers.
12.

Students.

13.

Housewives.

14.

Retired. Unemployed, and Widows.
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APPENDIX III

OUTPUT QUESTIONNAIRE

1.

Has the city participated in the federal urban reneval program?
( ) Yes
( ) No
If yes.
1a.

1b.

If no,
1c.

Approximately hov much money has been received by the
city from the federal government for urban reneval?

What, if any, action has the city taken in regard to fed
eral urban reneval in the last tvo years?

Has the city council considered such a federal urban
reneval program in the past tvo years?
( ) Yes ( ) No

If yes,
1d.

At vhat stage is this consideration currently?
Rejected

2.

Still under consideration?

Has the city participated in a local urban reneval program?
( ) Yes
( ) No
If yes,
,2a.

If no.
2b.

Has the city council taken any action in regard to
local urban reneval in the past tvo years?

Has the city council considered any type of local urban
reneval in the past tvo years? (
) Yes
( ) No
If yes,
2c.

At vhat stage is this consideration currently?
Rejected

3.

Still under consideration

Is there any type of citizen board linked to the police depart
ment?
( ) Yes
( ) No
If yes,
3a.

What is its title?
59
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3b.

When vas it created

3c.

Did the council create this board?
If no,
3d.

3e.

If no.
3f.

Was it created by a referendum?

If no.
4c.

) Yes

(

) No

Still under consideration

(

) Yes

(

) No

When vas it passed?
Has the council established a Housing Commission in
connection vith the ordinance? ( ) Yes
( ) No

Has the city council considered passage of one vithin
the last tvo years? ( ) Yes
( ) No
If yes,
4d.

At vhat stage is this consideration currently?
Rejected

5.

) No

At vhat stage is this consideration currently?

Does the city have an open housing ordinance?

4b.

(

(

Has the council considered establishing such a board
vithin the last tvo years?
( ) Yes
( ) No

_____ Rejected

If yes,
4a.

) Yes

Indicate briefly its relationship to the police depart
ment?

If yes,
3g.

4.

(

___ Still under consideration

Does your city have a Human Relations Commission or its equivalent?
(

) Yes

If yes,
5a.

If no,
5b.

(

) No

When vas it created?

Has the city council considered establishing such a
commission vithin the past tvo years?
( ) Yes
( ) No
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If yes,
5c.

At vhat stage is this consideration currently?
Rejected

6.

___ Still under consideration

Does your city fluoridate the vater supply of the community as
part of its public health program?
( ) Yes
( ) Xo
If yes,
6a.

6b.

When vas the program started?

How vas the decision made?
Administrative adoption
Council voting
Referenda

If no,
6c.

6d.

Was such a program considered vithin the past tvo years?
( ) Yes
( ) No
Who rejected the program?
City council____________ _____
Voters in Referenda
_____
Administrative action
_____

7.

Has an equal opportunity policy been implemented in the hiring
of city employees?
( ) Yes
( ) \ro
If yes,
7a.
7b.

When vas it adopted?
Who made the decision to implement this policy?
Administrative adoption (City Manager, Personnel
Director)
_____
City Council Voting
_____

If no,
7c.

If yes,
7d.

Has the city council considered such a policy in
the past tvo years?
( ) Yes
( ) Xo

At vhat stage is this consideration currently?
_____ Rejected

Still under consideration
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8.

Does the city council have a Code of Ethics for itself?
( ) Yes
( ) No
If yes,
8a.
If no,
8b.

8c.

When was it passed/adopted?

Has the city council considered one in
years?
(
) Yes
(
) No
At what

stage is this consideration currently?
____ Still under consideration.

Rejected

9.

Does your city have a municipal transportation system (Bus/
Electric Streetcar/etc.)?
( ) Yes
( ) No
If yes,
9a.

Is this
If yes,
9b.

system privately operated? (

Does the
(
)Yes
If no,
9c.

9d.
If n o ,
9e.
9f.

If no,
9g.

Does the city have
If yes,
10a.

) Yes

( ) No

city provide a subsidy to the owners?
() No
Has the city council considered a
subsidy in the past two years?
( ) Yes
(
) No
Vhat was the

result?

When did the city take over operation of the
system?
Has the city council approved efforts at ob
taining new equipment in the past tvo years?
( ) Yes
( ) No

Did municipal transportation go out of existence
the past tvo years?
(
) Yes
( )No
If yes,
9h.

10.

the past tvo

in

Did the city council consider the issue at
the time service ceased? ( ) Yes
(
) No

a municipal income tax?

( )Yes

Vhen was it enacted?
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() No

If no,
10b,

Has the city council considered enacting one in the
past tvo years?
( ) Yes
( ) No
If yes,
10c.

11.

Vhat vas the result?

Has there been a change to the city council's salary scale in the
past tvo years?
( ) Yes
( ) No
If yes.
11c.

At vhat stage is this consideration currently?
Rejected

12.

____ Still under consideration

Has the amount budgeted for parks and recreation ____ increased
greatly (major addition)_____ increased slightly______ remained the
same _____ decreased slightly

decreased greatly (major cut)

in the past tvo years?

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

APPENDIX IV

DATA FOR TESTS OF HYPOTHESIS ONE
(Excludes Data Presented in Chapter Three)

Hypothesis One.

SES authority characteristics are signifi

cantly related to the following outputs:
a)

Policies insuring equal rights for all groups living
in the community.

TABLE ONE —

Relations of Age of Council to Establish
ment of Citizen Police Review Board
Li

Citizen Police Review Board

Young

No Action
Action

TABLE TWO —

Middle

Old

10

10

8

0

2

0

Relation of Age of Council to Enactment
of Open Housing Ordinance

Mi
Open Housing Ordinance

Young

Middle

Old

No Action

4

5

2

Action

5

5

6

TABLE THREE —

Relation of Age of Council to Establish
ment of Human Relations Commission
Age

Human Relations Commission

Young

Middle

Old

No Action

6

5

2

Action

2

2

2

64
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TABLE POUR —

Relation of Income of Council to Establish
ment of Citizen Police Review Board
Income

Citizen Police Review Board
Mo Action

Low

High

10

8

11

1

0

1

Action

TABLE FIVE —

Middle

Relation of Income of Council to Establish
ment of Human Relations Commission
Income

Human Relations Commission

Low

Middle

High

No Action

4

5

4

Action

3

2

1

TABLE SIX —

Relation of Occupation of Council to Estab
lishment of Citizen Police Review Board
Occupation

Citizen Police Review Board
No Action
Action

TABLE SEVEN —

Professional

Non-Professional

22

6

1

1

Relation of Occupation of Council to Enact
ment of Open Housing Ordinance
Occupation

Open Housing Ordinance

Professional

No Action
Action

TABLE EIGHT —

Non-Professional

9

2

13

3

Relation of Occupation of Council to
Establishment of Human Relations Commission
Occupation

Human Relations Commission
No Action
Action

b)

Professional

Non-Professional

10

3

5

1

Policies benefiting particular segments of the community.
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TABLE NINE —

Relation of Age of Council to Establish
ment of Federal Urban Reneval Program
Age
Young

Middle

Old

No Action

6

6

4

Action

4

9

3

Federal Urban Reneval

TABLE TEN —

S

Relation of Age of Council to Establish
ment of Local Urban Reneval Program

'

Local

Urban Reneval

Young

Middle

Old

No Action

6

6

6

Action

3

7

2

TABLE ELEVEN —

Relation of Age of Council to Change
in Parks and Recreation Budget
Age

Parks and Recreation Budget

Young

Middle

Old

Increase

4

10

5

No Change

5

5

3

Decrease

2

0

0

TABLE TWELVE —

Relation of Income of Council to Estab
lishment of Local Urban Reneval Program
Income

Local Urban Reneval

Lov

Middle

High

No Action

6

7

5

Action

5

1

6
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TABLE THIRTEEN —

Relation of Income of Council to
Change in Parks and Recreation Budge
Income
Low

Middle

Increase

7

6

6

No Change

5

3

5

Decrease

0

0

2

TABLE FOURTEEN —

Relation of Occupation of Council to
Establishment of Local Urban Renewal Progr<
Occupalion

Local Urban Renewal

Professional

Non-Professional

14

8

4

4

No Action
Action

TABLE FIFTEEN —

Relation of Occupation of Council to Change
in Parks and Recreation Budget
Occupation

Parks and Recreation Budget

Professional
14

5

No Charge

9

4

Decrease

2

0

Increase

c)

Non-Pro fessional

Increase in council salary schedule.

Data, presented with tests

in Chapter Three.
d)

Enactment of municipal income tax.

TABLE SIXTEEN —

Relation of Age of Council to Enactment
of Municipal Income Tax
Age

Municipal Income Tax

Young

Middle

Old

No Action

0

0

1

Action

3

7

3
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TABLE SEVENTEEN —

Relation of Income of Council to Enact
ment of Municipal Income Tax
Income
Low

Municipal Income Tax

Middle

0

No Action
Action

TABLE EIGHTEEN —

High

1

0

2

I

Relation of Occupation of Council to
Enactment of Municipal Income Tax
Occupation
Professional

Municipal Income Tax
No Action
Action

Non-Professional

1

0

10

3

Fluoridation of vater supply.

TABLE NINETEEN —

Relation of Age of Council to Fluori
dation of Vater Supply
Age

Fluoridation of Vater Supply

Young

Middle

Old

No Action

5

4

4

Action

4

3

1

TABLE TVENTY —

Relation of Occupation of Council to Fluori
dation of Vater Supply
Occupation

Fluoridation of Vater
No Action
Action

Supply

Professional

Non-Professional

10

3

6

3
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APPENDIX V

DATA FOR TESTS OF HYPOTHESIS TVO
[Excludes Data Presented in Chapter Three)

Hypothesis Tvo.

Partisan affiliation and ideological identification

of authorities are significantly related to the following outputs:
a)

Policies insuring equal rights for all groups

l i v

i n

g

i n

t h e

communitv.

TABLE ONE —

Relation of Partisan Affiliation of Counci.1
to Establishment of Citizen Police Review Board
Partisan Affiliation

Citizen Police Review Board

Democratic

Non-Democratic

No Action

11

1

Action

17

1

TABLE TVO —

Relation of Ideological Identification of
Council to Establishment of Citizen Police
Review Board
Ideological Identification

Citizen Police Review Board

Liberal

Moderate

Conservative

No Action

8

8

12

Action

0

0

2

TABLE THREE —

Relation of Partisan Affiliation of Council
to Enactment of Open Housing Ordinance
Partisan Affiliation

Open Housing Ordinance

Democratic

Non-Democratic

No Action

6

5

Action

5

11

69
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TABLE FOUR —

Relation of Partisan Affiliation of Council
to Establishment of Human Relations Commission
Partisan Affiliation

Human Relations Commission

b)

Democratic

Non-Democratic

No Action

6

5

Action

4

3

Policies benefiting particular segments of the community.

TABLE FIVE —

Relation of Partisan Affiliation of Council
to Establishment of Federal Urban Reneval
Program
Partisan Affiliation

Federal Urban Reneval

Democratic

Non-Democratic

No Action

7

9

Action

6

9

TABLE SIX —

Relation of Ideological Identification of Council
to Establishment of Federal Urban Reneval Program
Ideological Identification

Federal Urban Reneval

Liberal

Moderate

Conservative

No Action

5

4

7

Action

6

3

6

TABLE SEVEN —

Relation of Partisan Affiliation of Council
to Establishment of Local Urban Reneval Program
Partisan Affiliation

Local Urban Reneval

Democratic

Non-Democratic

No Action

6

12

Action

6

6
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TABLE EIGHT —

Relation of Ideological Identification of
Council to Establishment of Local Urban
Renewal Program
Ideological Identification

Local Urban Renewal

Liberal

Moderate

Conservative

No Action

6

3

9

Action

3

4

5

TABLE NINE —

Relation of Partisan Affiliation of Council
to Change in Parks and Recreation Budget
Partisan Affiliation

Parks and Recreation Budget

Democratic

Non-Democratic

Increase

8

9

No Change

5

10

Decrease

1

1

TABLE TEN —

Relation of Ideological Identification of
Council to Change in Parks and Recreation
Budget
Ideological Identification

Parks and Recreation Budget

c)

Liberal

Moderate

Increase

9

3

6

No Change

2

4

8

Decrease

0

1

1

Increase in council salary schedule.

Conservative

Data presented with tests

in Chapter Three.
d)

Enactment of municipal income tax.

TABLE ELEVEN —

Relation of Partisan Affiliation of Council
to Enactment of Municipal Income Tax
Partisan Affiliation

Municipal Income Tax

Democratic

Non-Democratic

No Action

1

1

Action

5

8
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TABLE

TWELVE —

Relation of Ideological Identification of
Council to Enactment of Municipal Income
Tax
Ideological Identification

Municipal Income Tax

e)

Liberal

Moderate

Conservative

N'o Action

0

1

1

Action

5

4

4

Fluoridat ion of w a t e r

TABLE THIRTEEN' —

supply.

Relation of Partisan Affiliation of Council
to Fluoridation of Water Supply
Partisan Affiliation

Fluoridation of Water Supply

Democratic

N'on-Democratic

No Action

4

9

Action

6

3

TABLE FOURTEEN —

Relation of Ideological Identification of
Council to Fluoridation of Water Supply
Ideological Identificatior

Fluoridation of Water Supply
No Action
Action

Liberal

Moderate

Conservative

4

5

4

5

2

2
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APPENDIX VI

DATA FOR TESTS OF HYPOTHESIS THREE
(Excludes data presented in Chapter Three)

Hypothesis Three.

Aspiration for higher partisan office held by

authorities is significantly related to the following outputs:
a)

Policies insuring equal rights for all groups living in the
community.

TABLE ONE —

Relation of Aspiration for Higher Partisan
Office of Council to Establishment of Citizen
Police Review Board
Aspiration for Higher Partisan Office

Citizen Police Review Board

High

No Action
A c tio n

TABLE TWO --

Low

13

13

1

1

Relation of Aspiration for Higher Partisan Office
of Council to Enactment of Open Housing Ordinance
Aspiration for Higher Partisan Office

Open Housing Ordinance

High

Low

No Action

5

6

Action

5

11

TABLE THREE —

Relation of Aspiration for Higher Partisan
Office to Establishment of Human Relations
Commission
Aspiration for Higher Partisan Office

Human Relations Commission

High

Low

No Action

4

7

Action

2

4

73
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b)

Policies benefiting particular segments of the community.

TABLE FOUR —

Relation of Aspiration for Higher Partisan
Office to Establishment of Federal Urban
Renewal Program

High

Federal U rban Renewal

Low

N'o A c tion

6

10

Action

6

9

Rela tion of A s p i r a t i o n for H i g h e r Partisan
Office to E s t a b l i s h m e n t of Local U r b a n Renewal
Program

TABLE FI VE —

A s p i r a t i o n for H i g h e r Partisan Office
High

Local U rba n Renewal
N'o Action

8

10

A c t io n

5

7

TA B L E FIX —

R e l a tion of A s p i r a t i o n for H i g h e r Partisan
Office to C h ange in Parks and R e c r e a t i o n Budget
Aspiration

Parks and R e c r e a t i o n Budget

c)

Low

for H i g h e r Partisan Office
High.

Low

Increase

7

11

No Change

5

9

D ecrease

2

0

Increase

in council

salary schedule.

Data p r e s e n t e d with tests

in Chapter Three.
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APPENDIX VII

DATA FOR TESTS OF HYPOTHESIS FOUR
(Excludes data presented in Chapter Three)

H ypo thesis

Four.

The

cantly related to the
a)

Policies

length of s e r v i c e of auth oritie s

is s i g n i f i 

following outputs:

insuring equal

rights

for all groups

living in the

community.

TABLE ONE —

Relation of L e n g t h of Council Service to
Est abl i s h m e n t of C itizen Polic e Review Board
Length of Council
Short

C i t i zen Pol ice Revi ev Board
N'o Action

Long

12

16

1

1

Action

TAB LE TWO —

S ervice

Rel ation of T.ength of Council S ervice
Enactment of Open Housing Ordi nanc e

to

Length of Council
Short

Open H o u s i n g Ordina nc e

S ervice

Long

N'o Action

4

7

Action

8

8

TAB L E THREE —

R ela t i o n of Len gth of Counci 1 Service to
E s t a b l i s h m e n t of Human Relat ions C o m m i s s i o n
Length o f Council Ser vice
Short

H um a n Relations Comm i s s i o n

Lo ng

N'o Action

3

8

Act ion

4

2

75
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b)

Increase in council salary schedule.

Data presented with tests

in Chapter Three.
c)

Enactment of municipal income tax.

Data presented with tests in

Chapter Three.
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